Incentivizing preventive services in primary care : perspectives on Local Enhanced Services. by Marks, L. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
10 July 2012
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Marks, L. and Cave, S. and Wallace, A. and Mason, A. and Hunter, D.J. and Mason, J.M. and Peckham, S.
(2011) ’Incentivizing preventive services in primary care : perspectives on Local Enhanced Services.’, Journal
of public health., 33 (4). pp. 556-564.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pubmed/fdr016
Publisher’s copyright statement:
This is a pre-copy-editing author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of public health
following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Marks, L. and Cave, S. and Wallace, A. and
Mason, A. and Hunter, D.J. and Mason, J.M. and Peckham, S. (2011) ’Incentivizing preventive services in primary care
: perspectives on Local Enhanced Services.’, Journal of public health., 33 (4). pp. 556-564 is available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pubmed/fdr016
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Incentivising preventive services in primary care: perspectives on Local Enhanced Services   
Marks L.
1 
Cave S.
1
 Wallace A.
2 
Mason A.
3 
Hunter DJ.
1   
Mason JM.
1   
Peckham S. 
2 
Address correspondence to Linda Marks, E-mail:linda.marks@durham.ac.uk   
1
 School of Medicine and Health, Durham University Queen's Campus, Stockton-on-
Tees.  TS17 6BH, UK
  
2
 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 15-17 Tavistock Place,  
London WC1H 9SH, UK 
3
 Centre for Health Economics, University of York, Heslington, York Y010 5DD, UK  
 
Abstract 
 
Background 
General practitioners (GPs) in the UK play a key role in prevention but provision of 
preventive services is variable. The 2004 General Medical Services contract allows Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs) to address health needs through locally agreed payments for Local 
Enhanced Services (LESs).  This study identifies how this contractual flexibility is used for 
preventive services and explores its perceived effectiveness.  
 
Methods   
Semi-structured interviews were carried out (2008-09) in 10 purposively selected case study 
sites in England. Details of LESs for these sites were collected (2009) through Freedom of 
Information (FOI) requests or local contacts. A national on-line survey of PCTs (2009) 
provided a national context for case study findings.  
 
 
Results 
LESs were considered to be effective in incentivising preventive activity. However, 
specifications and performance management were often weak,  awareness of how to optimise 
incentives was low and, as optional services, LESs were perceived to be at risk in a financial 
downturn.  
 
Conclusions 
Using LESs for preventive services highlights gaps in ‘core’ primary care responsibilities and 
in the national pay-for-performance framework. Current incentive arrangements are complex, 
could increase inequity and provide only a partial, short-term solution to developing a 
proactive approach to prevention in primary care.  
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Background 
The use of incentives to improve the quality and outcomes of care is widespread. While ideas 
of agency, motivation and incentives are often considered central to improving performance, 
it has been argued
1   that there is a ‘lack of coherent established theory with predictive 
validity’ on the use of incentives in health care.  A systematic review of ‘pay-for-
performance (P4P) schemes’,2 including those for preventive services, found mixed evidence 
that schemes improved quality of care over the longer term.  However, recent evidence from 
the UK
3
 demonstrated that incentives can act as powerful levers to change primary care 
professionals’ behaviour, reducing variation in the quality of care and contributing to meeting 
targets. This study supported previous findings
4
 that incentive programmes need to take 
account of unintended consequences and recognise ‘knightly and knavish’5 motivations.  
Theoretical analyses have set out the principles governing the design of ‘optimal incentive 
contracts’ (Table 1)6,7   including ‘informativeness’, that is, performance measures that allow 
more accurate estimates of agent effort (distinct from the influence of factors outside the 
agent’s control); ‘incentive  intensity’, where the strength of incentives reflects the likely 
  
returns; ‘monitoring intensity’, where monitoring is proportionate to variation in 
performance; and ‘equal compensation’, intended to  avoid perverse consequences where  
providing  strong incentives for some activities reduces efforts elsewhere.   
As commissioning organisations in the English NHS, PCTs can draw on a range of incentives 
and contractual flexibilities to encourage service providers to improve quality, increase 
choice, meet performance targets, encourage ‘care closer to home’, and respond to local 
health needs. In relation to primary care, commissioners can  reward practices for  managing 
demand for acute care,
8
 set  targets which extend the nationally agreed P4P Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF), 
9
 create separate innovation funds or reward schemes, and 
deploy a range of enhanced services, agreed as  part of the national 2004 General Medical 
Services (GMS) contract.
10
   The package of enhanced services (Directed, National and 
Local)  is additional to essential services provided to all patients through the  GMS contract, 
and is non-mandatory for general practices.  Directed Enhanced Services (DESs) must be 
offered to all eligible practices by PCTs; National Enhanced Services (NESs) are designed to 
meet local needs but follow national specifications and benchmark pricing; Local Enhanced 
Services (LESs) are developed locally with PCTs choosing which services to commission and 
agreeing incentives to be offered.  LESs may also be used to incentivise enhanced 
performance in relation to the QOF, essential services, DESs, or to encourage early adoption 
of planned DESs.   
Recent reviews of incentives in general practice have largely focused on the impact of the 
QOF
3, 11   
and there have been no empirical evaluations of LESs. However, expenditure on 
LESs has increased substantially over recent years - rising from almost £251 million in 
2007/08 to a projected £372 million in 2009/10 - equivalent to a 48% increase over two 
years.
12
 This article analyses qualitative and quantitative data on commissioners’ use of LESs 
  
to incentivise preventive services in primary care, highlighting benefits and disadvantages 
and the relative importance of financial and other sources of motivation. It forms part of a 
wider study on the impact of governance structures and incentive arrangements on 
commissioning for health and well-being.
13
  
 
Methods  
The study drew on three sources of data: interviews from 10 case study sites; LES 
documentation from these sites; and a national questionnaire survey of PCTs.  Sampling with 
replacement occurred until 10 PCTs meeting selection criteria were recruited, out of a total of 
22 PCTs invited.  Case study sites reflected: levels of deprivation (with half the sample 
falling within the 10% most deprived areas in England); a regional spread; and a range of 
population size and performance ratings. Interviewees were selected to reflect key decision-
making roles in commissioning:  PCT Chief Executives (3), Directors, including Directors of   
Public Health (DsPH) (44) and Non-Executive Directors (7) as well as General Practitioners 
(GPs) acting as Professional Executive Committee (PEC) chairs (8) and practice-based 
commissioning (PBC) leads (12).  Interview schedules were piloted and one hour semi-
structured interviews were carried out either face-to-face (52) or by telephone (22) in two 
phases between October 2008 and January 2010.  Written consent was obtained prior to 
interviews, which were recorded and transcribed. This article focuses on responses to 
questions on: incentives for providing additional preventive services in primary care; the 
most effective ways of incentivising preventive services; and the relative importance of 
financial and other sources of motivation. Themes arising from interview data were identified 
inductively, grouped by two members of the project team (LM, SC) and analysed by 
frequency, site and category of respondent.  
  
 
Using Freedom of Information (FOI) requests or local contacts, LESs from the ten case study 
sites were collected in 2009. Informed by findings from first phase fieldwork, a national 
survey of PCTs was undertaken between October and December 2009. It  
was distributed through the web tool SurveyMonkey to 508 individuals in 146/152 PCTs:  
PCT Board Chairs; DsPH; PEC Chair/ Medical Directors; and Directors of Commissioning 
(some PCTs share Boards, hence reduced numbers). The survey explored how PCTs 
prioritised, incentivised and commissioned health and well-being services Analysis of 
interview data was informed by a review of economic perspectives on incentives carried out 
as part of the project and compared with the documentary analysis of LESs and relevant 
results from the national on-line survey. 
   
Results  
Responses to the national survey were received from 65% (95/146) of PCTs with 
representation from all regions, most major cities and rural areas: the individual response rate 
was 27% (138/508).  LESs were the most commonly cited vehicle for incentivising 
preventive activities in primary care, used by 70 % of responding PCTs (Figure 1). 
 
Documentary and interview analysis identified 155 LESs across the 10 case study sites. Of 
these, 72 related to preventive services (Table 2) and  61 related to providing care closer to 
home (where additional to National and Directed Enhanced Services) in areas such as near 
patient testing and monitoring, diagnostics and screening, minor surgery, and management of 
conditions including heart failure, diabetes and deep vein thrombosis. The remainder related 
  
to improving access, ethnicity monitoring, practice-based commissioning, training support, 
data collection and information technology. 
 
Table 2 shows that 7/10 sites had smoking cessation LESs with practices and /or community 
pharmacies; five had LESs in place for cardiovascular (CVD) risk assessment and 
management and seven had LESs for Chlamydia screening. Other preventive LESs included:   
additional or more frequent patient data to that required for the QOF; falls prevention; 
proactive care of elderly people; and enhanced services for depression and anxiety.  Payment 
was either activity-related (for example, vaccinations, minor surgery or contraceptive 
implants) or based on the number of registered patients (for example, CVD risk 
management). In some cases, payment was contingent on achieving targets or on the 
provision of additional information (such as baseline assessments and audits). For example, 
in one site, the LES payment was withheld if more than 10% of patients with diabetes 
attended secondary care. On the other hand, some LESs included bonus payments for 
reaching certain targets. For example, in one CVD LES, a bonus payment of £100 per 1000 
patients on the practice list was applied if the practice screened 10% of the practice target 
population.     
 
In the national survey, respondents were asked whether they considered LESs an effective 
route for commissioning health and well-being services. Of the 72 respondents who answered 
this survey question 8% rated LESs as ‘very effective’, 65% ‘quite effective’, 23% ‘not very 
effective’ and 3% ‘very ineffective’.  
 
 LESs were discussed in 58/74 interviews (Table 3). Most interviewees (62%) considered 
them an effective and appropriate route for incentivising GPs, given the ‘small business’ and 
  
entrepreneurial model of primary care, inflexibility of the core GMS contract, and the 
increased workload involved. Interviewees noted the effectiveness of LESs in pump-priming 
change; addressing gaps in the QOF; helping to meet PCT targets for smoking cessation and 
Chlamydia screening; addressing inequalities through management of CVD; and encouraging 
GPs to focus on health and well-being and care closer to home.  For example, smoking 
cessation targets in one site had been exceeded by increasing incentives for practices and 
some PCTs had chosen to weight LES payments to encourage targeting of specific 
populations or areas. 
 
In two sites with low numbers of LESs, there were plans to extend their use. In contrast, 
interviewees from three sites with the highest numbers of LESs   commented on their 
incremental and piecemeal development, which could lead to ‘cherry picking’ as well as 
confusion amongst providers:  
 
‘And actually… it’s really difficult to keep a handle on all those different ones and try to 
remember, well does this person fit the criteria for a depression one… and you’re trying to 
do this in your consultations.’ (PEC Chair) 
 
Their complexity had resulted in initiatives to rationalise LESs through combining related or 
commonly adopted LESs or channelling agreements through networks of GPs rather than 
through individual practices to encourage standardisation of care, improve performance 
management and develop collaboration.  Common factors were also being explored. For 
example, a LES for motivational interviewing could apply across a range of risk factors.  
 
  
Despite their success in motivating GPs, 43% of interviewees identified one or more 
drawbacks to LESs.  Most commonly cited was their voluntary nature resulting in an uneven 
and inequitable distribution of services if practices refused to take them up, did not need the 
additional resources or if services were not targeted. Even if targets for payment for the LESs 
were met, this did not guarantee that the most vulnerable or those at highest risk had been 
reached.   Moreover, disparity in the quality of general practice, as indicated, for example, in 
QOF scores, could be reflected in implementation.  
 
Second were weaknesses in specification, monitoring and evaluation, described by one 
interviewee as follows: 
 
‘Well ... I think that there's a complexity around the enhanced services.  We've got over 30 
and sometimes I think the practices themselves lose sight of what it is they're trying to do.  
Secondly, I think some of the specifications are very weak and not particularly helpful.  And 
thirdly the data reporting against them isn't perfect at all.  So there's probably some way to 
go in terms of a leverage or a tool.’ (Director of Commissioning) 
 
LESs also reflected wider problems with using incentives.  At a contractual level it was 
important to get the level of incentives right and understand ‘the science of incentives’. A 
Director of Finance commented:  
 
‘We don’t yet fully understand and haven’t got a grasp on what we can do to maximise the 
potential of contracts that we are having to put in place and how incentives and disincentives 
can influence things.’ 
 
  
LESs were considered a short-term solution. Interviewees noted the importance of other 
sources of motivation, including benchmarking, audit, peer review and peer approval; 
professional and public sector ethos; concern for patients and health of the local population; 
and effective levels of engagement with commissioners. It was argued that long-term cultural 
change was required if GPs were to provide proactive preventive care and this needed better 
understanding of a range of motivating factors. 
 
There were also perverse consequences of adopting a transactional and micro-management 
approach, as reflected in both the LES and the QOF. Incentives  initially offered to pump- 
prime change in the short-term could become perceived as a permanent financial resource by 
providers requiring ‘a LES for everything’; conversely there was a risk of rewarding services 
which were already being provided  or which should be considered part of a core professional  
role. Financial incentives could serve to undermine intrinsic motivation (the ‘crowding out’ 
problem). One interviewee commented: 
   
‘I mean as a doctor myself,  I do question do you need to incentivise a professional to do their 
job they’re being paid for, and sometimes I think we overrate the incentive bit and forget 
about the compelling information, the message, the audit and the feedback to professionals to 
show the impact of engaging in health and well-being.’ (Director of Strategic Planning)  
 
Interviewees in four sites highlighted a lack of alignment of incentives across the healthcare 
system or the failure to consider the impact of incentives on other parts of the system. One 
interviewee cited a lack of capacity to respond to referrals generated through a LES designed 
to prevent falls:  
 
  
‘If you put an incentive in one part of the system how’s the rest of the system aligned to that?  
Because you can do all the proactive work in the world but if the rest of the system has still 
only got the capacity to respond to reactive (work) … it doesn't take long for the system to get 
clogged’.  (PCT Director)  
 
Incentives for preventive services highlighted the fact that prevention was not adequately 
prioritised within the healthcare system. One or more criticisms were raised by 28% of 
interviewees over the lack of incentives for health and well-being, described, for example, as 
an ‘add on’ which had to be paid for separately. Payment by Results incentivised hospital 
activity and there were gaps in the QOF, which concentrated on the easily measurable and 
allowed exception reporting. NESs did not include preventive services and there were few 
incentives for GPs to focus on prevention, either financially or in terms of patient approval. 
Health and well-being was a long-term agenda while incentives were often short-term. 
Proposed solutions included: incorporating a preventive component in all services; reworking 
payment structures and contracts to incentivise improved outcomes of care; making GPs 
accountable for budgets; or commissioning services from alternative providers. The dangers 
of funding evidence-based preventive services through optional incentive schemes rather than 
through core contracts were also stressed.  
 
In six sites, interviewees observed that LESs were easy to cut in times of financial stringency, 
such as the current economic downturn. This raised concerns over the future of preventive 
services in primary care.         
 
 
Discussion 
  
Main findings of this study 
LESs are the most common route for incentivising preventive services in general practice,  
appropriate for  a ‘small business’ model of primary care and considered effective in pump-
priming change and meeting targets.  However, LESs have developed in a piecemeal manner 
since their introduction in 2004. They varied in level of specification, quality of monitoring 
and associated penalties or rewards. As an optional element of the GMS contract, they 
increased inequity of access to preventive services through differential take up and targeting 
by independent contractors, tended to be poorly implemented in low-performing practices 
and were seen by commissioners as an easy target for cuts. Although originally intended to 
address local health needs, in practice they also indicated gaps in the national P4P system for 
primary care (QOF) and variation in providing preventive services. The study demonstrated 
limitations of individual financial incentives in promoting longer-term change and the 
importance of also considering professional ethos, collaborative approaches and outcomes-
based contracts. 
 
What is already known on this topic 
It has been demonstrated that incentives are effective in changing primary care practice 
2,3,14
 
and that the QOF is encouraging a more systematised approach to managing long-term 
conditions in primary care.
11
  Moreover, theoretical analyses have set out principles of 
optimal incentive contracts as a guide to contract specification and monitoring.
6,7
 However, 
health and well-being are not adequately incentivised in a healthcare system where payment 
is largely activity-based and the emphasis is on short-term delivery.
15
 The impact of specific 
financial incentives is influenced by the configuration and degree of alignment of incentives 
across a health care system
3 
and financial incentives should not be considered in isolation 
from other sources of motivation.
5  
  
 
What this study adds 
While LESs provide a means for exploring the effectiveness of financial incentives in 
motivating contractors to provide preventive services, neither the extent of deployment of 
optional short-term incentives for this purpose by commissioners nor views of  their potential 
benefits or disadvantages have been previously analysed. This study carried out a national 
survey to identify LESs for preventive services and interviews with key stakeholders to 
identify their views.  
 
Limitations of the study 
LESs for case study sites were identified either through contacts or through FOI requests. 
However this is a snapshot as LESs can be established or withdrawn at short notice and are 
often reviewed annually. Survey questions on the value of incentives were those least 
frequently answered by respondents and 50% did not respond to this question. While half the 
case study sites were selected to reflect areas of greater deprivation, the survey was national 
and this limits comparison. Twenty one per cent of interviewees did not discuss LESs in any 
detail so did not contribute to the analysis.  
 
Conclusion  
Health and well-being services may be commissioned from a range of providers including the 
voluntary and community sector, independent contractors and local authorities. In England, 
public health commissioning is about to become more complex following the publication of 
the NHS White Paper
16
  with a new national body, Public Health England, responsible  for 
commissioning services through local authorities, GP consortia via a National  
Commissioning Board as well as for some directly provided services.
17   
There is also  a 
  
greater emphasis on health outcomes, encouraging partnerships, and a  local ‘health 
premium’  for local government to incentivise progress in improving health.18 
 
LESs for evidence-based interventions, such as identifying CVD risk, are indicative of gaps 
in the QOF and of local variation in the quality of primary care. They raise questions over   
the expected contribution of GPs to reducing preventable morbidity, especially in the context 
of a more diverse provider landscape. Many of the activities currently funded through LESs, 
such as health check programmes, smoking cessation, prevention and treatment of alcohol 
misuse, falls prevention, and mental health promotion will now be commissioned through the 
public health budget of local authorities, which is to be ring-fenced.  
  
Whether these changes in the commissioning architecture address current fragmentation and 
variability in evidence-based preventive services remains to be seen. Experience from LESs   
suggests that while financial incentives are effective in changing practice, outcomes-based 
contracts rather than activity-related incentives could encourage a more proactive approach. 
However, much depends on the size of the public health budget and whether preventive 
services continue to be viewed as an easy target for cuts in a financial downturn.  
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Figure 1:  Types of Local Enhanced Services commissioned by PCTs 
 
 
 
 
% of PCTs (n =72) commissioning LES  
  
Table I:  Economic principles for optimal incentive contracts 
1,2 
Principle  Definition Implications for commissioners 
The 
informativeness 
principle 
Factor in performance measures 
that allow agent effort to be 
estimated more precisely and 
exclude performance measures 
that chiefly reflect factors outside 
of the agent’s control. 
Commissioners may require agents to 
report activity data, e.g. on efforts to 
follow up and support non-attenders 
at weight loss clinics; routine 
feedback on smoking status of those 
offered advice to quit.  
The incentive-
intensity 
principle 
The strength of incentives should 
reflect the marginal returns to 
task, the accuracy with which 
performance is measured, the 
responsiveness of the agent’s 
efforts to incentives, and the 
agent’s risk tolerance. 
Sometimes, the most difficult to reach 
populations are those with greatest 
capacity to benefit.  Additional 
payments could be made for reaching 
these populations with public health 
interventions.  
The monitoring 
intensity 
principle 
Monitoring is a costly activity.  
More resources should be spent 
monitoring when it is desirable to 
give strong incentives, e.g. there 
is substantial variation in 
performance or performance is 
uniformly poor. 
If benchmarking data suggest that a 
PCT is performing significantly 
below national average standards in 
some area (e.g. smoking cessation 
rates), commissioners may wish to 
monitor provider performance more 
intensively to signal the importance 
of changing behaviour. 
The equal 
compensation 
principle 
If principals cannot monitor an 
agent’s allocation of time, 
incentives should ensure that the 
marginal returns earned by the 
agent are equal for all tasks the 
agent undertakes.  Providing 
strong incentives for only some 
activities can cause agents to 
reduce effort in other activities.  
If local public health indicators are 
added to the QOF, care should be 
taken to ensure that targets are 
broadly aligned with commissioner 
objectives; if equity issues are a 
concern, payments could be adjusted 
to reflect this (e.g. thresholds for 
triggering maximum payments could 
be raised if unmet need is 
concentrated in lower socioeconomic 
groups).  
1. Milgrom P, Roberts J. Economics, organization and management. Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992. 
2. Williamson OE. Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations. 
American Economic Review 1973; 63:316-25. 
  
Table 2: Distribution of Local Enhanced Services (2009) for preventive services across 
10 case study sites 
 Case study site                                                                                    
Local Enhanced Service 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Vaccination            
HPV catch up  x x x x     x 5 
MMR catch up  x(2)   x    x   4 
Hep B     x x     2 
Hep A x          1 
Men C (freshers)   x        1 
Influenza  
(at risk groups additional to the DES)  
       x x  2 
BCG     x      1 
Vaccine (other)            
Sexual health             
Sexual health LES     x      1 
Chlamydia  screening (GP) x x x x x    x x 7 
Chlamydia screening  (pharmacy)       x    1 
Contraceptive  implants  x x   x x x  x 6 
IUCD x  x    x x   4 
Emergency contraception (pharmacy) x      x    2 
Lifestyle interventions            
Smoking cessation  (GP)  x  x x  x  x  x 6 
Smoking cessation  (Pharmacy) x     x x    3 
Alcohol: case finding/ brief  interventions  x x  x    x  4 
Drug and alcohol abuse     x      1 
Disease prevention/early diagnosis            
CVD/CHD risk management  x  x x x   x  5 
COPD     x x     2 
Osteoporosis diagnosis and prevention  x         1 
Anxiety and depression     x      1 
Vulnerable groups            
Learning disability health check 
 
 x   x   x   3 
Substance misuse      x x    2 
Vulnerable older people     x      1 
Support to carers    x      x 2 
Falls prevention 
 
         x 1 
Medicine non compliance (mental health) 
(pharmacy) 
      x    1 
Improving data collection            
Public health related data (targets on smoking, 
obesity, breast feeding and diabetes) 
x     x     2 
Total 9 7 7 6 12 8 7 6 4 6 72 
 
  
Table 3   Views of Local Enhanced Services: themes and sub-themes arising from the qualitative analysis   
Themes        
   Sub-themes     Sites 
1.Financial 
incentives are 
effective 
(62%  per 
cent of  
interviewees
1
) 
 Financial 
incentives  
motivate GPs 
(61% of 
interviewees
2
)  
Help meet 
PCT targets 
(16.6 %) 
 
May reflect 
reward for 
increased 
workload 
(16.6%) 
An effective 
route for 
addressing 
gaps in QOF 
(16.6%) 
LESs are the 
only 
contractual 
option 
(11.6%) 
10 
 2.LES- 
specific 
problems  
(43 %) 
 Unequal take up 
by practices 
/increase 
inequalities 
(56%) 
Complex, 
inadequate 
specification / 
monitoring 
(28 %)   
LESs 
encourage 
transactional 
approaches 
(16%) 
Poorly 
implemented 
in low-
performing 
practices 
(12%) 
 10 
3. Other  
sources of 
motivation 
are important  
(40 %)  
 Concern with 
patient and 
population health 
(43%) 
Peer approval 
(22%) 
Cultural  
shifts 
 (17 %) 
Audit and 
feedback 
(9%) 
 9 
4. Problems 
with financial 
incentives 
(38%) 
 Incentivising one 
part of the system 
leads to 
fragmentation/lack 
of alignment of 
incentives  
(27 %) 
Financial 
incentives 
have only 
short-term 
impact  
(18%) 
Tend to 
reward 
activity not 
outcomes  
(18 %) 
Incentivising 
activities 
which are 
core to a 
professional 
role  
(18%) 
 
Use of 
incentives is 
poorly 
understood 
(13.6 %) 
10 
5.New 
approaches 
needed 
(31%) 
 Alternative 
providers  
(45%) 
Outcomes -
based 
contracts/QOF 
(30%) 
Make GPs 
accountable 
for budgets 
(20%) 
  9 
6. Health and 
well-being 
are not 
adequately 
incentivised 
(28%) 
 QOF does not 
incentivise health 
and well being 
 (88 %) 
Payment by 
results does 
not incentivise 
prevention 
(19%) 
Contracts 
are not 
outcomes -
based 
(19%) 
   8 
1. Total number of interviewees = 58  
2. Total  refers to interviewees expressing relevant main theme  
 
 
